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Abstract 
Taxing small deposits used to be a taboo in European politics – but why? This contribution re-
assesses the protection of small deposits from an angle that has not received much attention in 
the current debate: the politico-philosophical, ordo-liberal, and social-political perspectives, 
arguing that protection of the ordinary saver is a fundament of our civil societies.    
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Protection of property as fundament for a stable society 
The Cyprus crisis and the public discussion has stimulated re-thinking the fundaments on 
which our democracies are built, and reflecting on to what extent a tax on small deposits puts 
these fundaments into danger. According to Hobbes (1647, 1651) protection of property 
serves to maintain internal peace in society. That the protection of property constitutes a key 
duty of any government is a direct consequence of the original state of nature, which was 
characterized by a fight of atomistic human beings against each other – fighting for obtaining 
resources, fighting for keeping those resources and, finally, fighting for life. In this state of 
nature human beings enjoyed the right to property only to the extent to which they were 
physically able to defend it by themselves. In order to overcome this miserable and anarchic 
state, people consented on the ‘social contract’ that established a political authority which was 
given the means to make laws and to enforce them. It follows from that that the ‘rule of law’, 
the equality before the law and the subjection of all to the law (including the ruler), implies 
protecting the weak against the strong – in the case of the EU crisis, it implies the protection 
of the property of the weak against expropriation/exploitation by the stronger (any person or 
institution, like banks, the EU, or the government itself).  
 
Cypriot government failed to protect its citizens 
Altogether, political philosophy reveals the strong linkage between obeying the basic 
principles ‘rule of law’, ‘protection of property’ and social and political stability in a country 
– it was Locke (1690) who argued that if a government failed to comply with its duties, the 
people had a right to revolt and to choose a new government. In that respect, it would have 
been the obligation of the Cypriot government to protect its ordinary, not overly wealthy 
citizens against expropriation efforts by the EU or other institutions; as Locke would have 
predicted, not having done so resulted in citizens’ protest on the streets and their loss in trust 
in their current government, and the EU. In this light, already bringing the faux-pas word 
‘deposit tax’ into play during the EU negotiations can be regarded as putting into question the 
basic principles on which our modern societies are built.  
Why should governments safeguard small deposits? 
But do we have economic reasons to argue that small deposit owners are the ‘weak’ in society 
who are in need government protection? The theory of market perfection to achieve global 
efficiency may provide some answers (e.g. Musgrave, 1959): small depositors might be put at 
a disadvantage compared to large investors because of a) market power of local banks, caused 
by b) restricted access of ordinary people to financial markets, aggravated by c) an 
information asymmetry between financial product sellers and those who buy them 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958; notably, the latter market failure caused the first financial 
market crisis in 2008). While economic theory assumes that also small savers had a choice 
between several ways of investing their money, they are, in reality, entirely depending on the 
financial products the local banks as financial intermediaries offer them and the information 
they provide (Diamond, 1984): This ‘no choice’ situation forces ordinary savers to bear the 
bank’s business risk that might be, in the case of Cyprus, higher than the one they would have 
preferred. In sum, due to financial market imperfections the speculation of local banks creates 
(unwanted) negative spill-overs on the ordinary deposit holder.  
 
Safeguarding as result of justice considerations 
Economic theory proposes various solutions to internalize negative spill-overs (e.g. 
Musgrave, 1959); however, most of these are not applicable to our case because a) financial 
intermediaries work in national, segmented markets, while b) capital itself is mobile across 
countries. This calls for international cooperative solutions to restrain bank’s risky behavior 
that are insufficient and difficult to achieve (e.g. the agreements Basel I and II). In addition, in 
the case of Cyprus, the government colluded with the local banks and showed no interest in 
regulating the banking sector in order to prevent excessive speculation (offered savings rates 
were between 4% and 6%, while world growth rate was about 3% to 4%). In this light of 
missing means to internalize negative externalities, safeguarding deposits, while not 
constituting a remedy, can be regarded as a consumer protection mechanism against the 
negative effects of this externality on their savings. If we view ‘global efficiency’ as the result 
of justice and fairness in market processes (in the tradition of Rawls, 1971), the principle to 
safeguard small depositors can be seen as a compensating and redistributive policy that 
establishes a socially fair outcome. 
 
The faux-pas word ‘deposit tax’ and public trust 
We can conclude that the announcement of a tax on small deposits was rightly perceived by 
the European public as unjustified expropriation effort because of its contradiction to the ‘rule 
of law’ and to the principle of fairness. Simply enunciating this policy idea on Saturday night 
(to which the Cypriote delegate had agreed to) was not only disastrous for Cypriots’ consent 
to their government and the EU as such; also the fact that implementation of this tax was, in 
some instances, on Sunday, prior to the vote of the national parliament on Monday added to 
its trust-destructive effect – according to public choice theory, the parliamentary vote 
represents people’s consent, ensuring that policies serve the ‘common good’ and not group 
interests (e.g., Mueller, 2003). Hence, the clumsiness with which the Cypriot government 
tried to introduce this tax equally contradicted and undermined the principles of democracy.  
These arguments show the importance of discussing the EU crisis and the policy response for 
Cyprus not solely under aspects of banking sector stability; besides negative macroeconomic 
consequences for the whole EU-region (Fischer, 2013), people’s trust in the national 
government (Fischer, 2012), but also in banks, and in the EU has been substantially eroded, as 
recent polls also in Germany suggest. Trust, however, is the fundament on which the EU is 
built, which we need to restore; otherwise we risk trading off EU’s future and that of our 
democracies for the Euro. 
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